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A significant number of patents have been and currently are
being granted for trivial innovations. Examples could be cited,
but only a reader possessed of technical expertise and presented
with a scientifically selected sample could be expected to make
a fair judgment about the quality control of the patent procedure. While such a scientific study should prove helpful in the
consideration of patent reform, any final judgment about quality
control will obviously be subjective. It is sufficient that the preliminary consideration of patent law reform undertaken in this
Article is based not only upon the author's own experiences but
also upon his discussions with other patent attorneys, who share
his conclusions. The object of this Article is to develop several
proposals for improving quality control in the procedures both
for issuing patents and for clearing the channels of commerce of
invalid patents prior to their normal expiration.
* Professor, Emory University School of Law. The author acknowledges the assistance of Ms. June McClure, J.D., Emory University,

1972, in the preparation of this Article.
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BASIC PATENTS AND IMPROVEMENT PATENTS

The Patent Act of 19521 gave the first statutory life to a
standard of patentability which the courts had been applying
for over a century. 2 To the traditional statutory standards of
novelty and usefulness, 3 Congress added the requirement of
"non-obvious subject matter."4 The Act provides:
A patent may not be obtained . .. if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains ....

5

Despite this attempt to codify a long line of judicial precedents,
there remains "a notorious difference between the standards
[of patentability] applied by the Patent Office and by the
courts."6 A principal cause for this difference is the excessive
number of patent applications, each imposing upon the Patent
Office the requirement for a careful examination and a timeconsuming search. There is a tendency for examiners to resolve
any doubt in favor of the applicant and protect the "inventor" of
a minor improvement against the use of his improvement by
others. Unfortunately, the only option to refusing protection is
to grant a 17-year monopoly. In many cases, examiners seem
to compensate for the duration of the monopoly by allowing
only claims of narrow scope, relying on technical distinctions
between the "invention" and prior art. In contrast, a court disturbed by the duration of the 17-year monopoly may invalidate
a "doubtful" patent, despite its narrow scope. Any efforts by
the Patent Office to refine its standards of patentability and to
conform them to the standard of nonobviousness applied by
the judiciary are inhibited by a lack of resources and the limitations of ex parte proceedings.
One method of reconciling the Patent Office's standards
with current judicial attitudes would be to authorize two classes
of utility patents. 7 The 17-year term and rigorous examination
requirements could be maintained for a class of patents to be
granted for "basic" inventions, while a patent for a shorter term
such as five years could be available upon less rigorous exanina1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1966).
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1970).
Id. § 103.
Id.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
For a similar proposal which the author consulted, see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTTRUST POLICY 171-72 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
KAYSEN & TuRNER].
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tion for "improvement" inventions. An applicant could apply
for either class of patent, but many inventors of mere improvements would be deterred from applying for a basic patent by a
higher fee and more rigorous examination standards.8 The availability of a "consolation prize" would make it easier for the
Patent Office to resist granting a basic patent for an insignificant invention 9 and thereby narrow the gap between Patent Office and judicial basic patent standards. The reduced term of
the improvement patent might assuage judicial concern over
granting a monopoly for a minor invention.

A. DuAL PATENT SYsTEMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
West Germany was the first country to enact a special law
to protect minor inventions. The Gebrauchsmuster (Utility
Model) law,10 which has been an impetus and model for several
other countries," authorizes protection only of the shape or configuration of a useful article. This narrow coverage excludes
manufacturing processes, electrical circuitry, chemical products,
and complicated mechanisms. Actually, the Utility Model laws
occupy an area of subject matter between regular and design
patent laws. In a few countries, however, the subject matter
for minor patents is more nearly coextensive with that for regu12
lar patents.
Germany requires novelty, technical progress, and inventive
step for a Gebrauchsmuster registration just as it does for a regular patent, but the standards for technical progress and inventive step are quantitatively lower. While the German Patent
Office examines an application for registration only as to form
and suitability of the subject matter, the registration is subject
to both validity attack in infringement litigation and nullity
proceedings in the Patent Office. In Japan, an application for
8. W. Lovett, Patents and Headstarts: A Study of the Polyolefin
Plastics 316 n.38 (1969) (unpublished thesis in Michigan State University
Library) [hereinafter cited as Lovett].
9.

KAYsEN & TURNER, supra note 7, at 172.

10. See Crotti, The German Gebrauchsmuster,39 J. PAT. OPF. Soc'y
566 (1957); Lynfield, German Utility Models, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 374
(1965); Mott, The Concept of Small Patent in European Legal Systems
and Equivalent Protection Under United States Law, 49 VA. L. REv. 232
(1963).
11.

2 J. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRAcTicc

29-35 (1974)

[hereinafter cited as BAXTER]. There are similar laws in Brazil, Italy,
Japan, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan,
and Tangier.
12. See, e.g., Lecca, New French Patent Law and Rules of Practice, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 356, 357 (1969). In France a regular patent
must be sought for medicines and processes for their manufacture.
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a Utility Model patent is subject to the same patentability requirement as a regular patent application, except that less technical advance is required. 13 In many countries, the term of a
Utility Model registration is shorter than that of a regular patent.14 Opposition proceedings are frequently permitted under
Utility Model laws.15
In Germany, an inventor may file simultaneous applications
for a regular patent and -a Gebrauchsmuster registration; the
Gebrauchsmuster application remains open until there is a decision on the grant of a regular patent. If a regular patent of
sufficient scope is granted, the Gebrauchsmuster application
may be abandoned. If a regular patent is denied or is limited in
its scope, the Gebrauchsmuster registration may be pursued.
Germany allows both types of patents to be granted for the
same invention, but some countries require an election.' 0 While
Germany does not permit one type of application to be converted
into another, some countries permit a regular patent application to be converted into a utility registration application,17 and
a few countries permit either type to be converted.' 8

B. A PROPOSAL FOR A DuAL PATENT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
1.

PatentabilityStandards

A system of two classes of patents is a compromise between
the premise that innovation should be encouraged and the opposing premise that the burden of patent monopolies on the con13. Otani, Introduction to the Japanese Patent System, 7 PAT.
TRADEm
Copy. J. REs. & ED., Sept., 1963, at 14-15.
14. There is considerable variation in the length of the term and
the point from which it is computed: Brazil (10 years from filing);
France (6 years from filing); Germany (6 years from day following
filing); Italy (4 years from filing); Japan (10 years from publication);
Philippines (15 years from issue); Poland (10 years from filing); Portugal (no set term, but may be renewed every 5 years); South Korea
(10 years from registration, but cannot exceed 12 years from filing);
Spain (20 years); Taiwan and Tangier (10 years from filing). In several countries, it is necessary to pay periodic renewal fees to keep the
patent in force: Germany (renewal fee after 3 years); South Korea
(annual renewal fee). BAxTER, supra note 11, at 30-34, 218.
15. Opposition proceedings are permitted in Japan, Portugal, South
Korea, Spain, and Taiwan. Id. at 31-34. France does not have an
opposition procedure for the Certificate of Utility but does publish the
application for comments by third parties. These comments are simply
transmitted to the applicant who is not required to respond but is permitted to amend his claims in light of the comments. Id. at 219.
16. For example, an election must be made in France. Lecca,
supra note 12, at 357.
17. Id.
18. E.g., BAxTE, supra note 11, at 32.1 (Poland).
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sumer should be minimized. Thus the proposed system is based
on the assumption that the beneficial inventions included in the
new class are likely to be produced despite the prospect of a
shorter period of patent protection. Obviously, this cannot be
reliably and inexpensively determined for any particular invention, as the only direct evidence might be the self-serving testimony of the inventor or his sponsor, while indirect evidence
would probably be inconclusive. Nevertheless, there are methods that might produce a crude estimate of the inventions that
are likely to be foregone in the absence of long-term patent protection. Since such inventions would often involve costlier research, the length of the patent term could be based on the
amount spent on research. In principle, this approach would be
objectionable because it would penalize the inventors of superior ability who are able to avoid high costs. In practice, it would
tempt investors to incur unnecessary expenses in developing an
invention where long-term protection is thought to be commercially valuable. This would necessitate the development of a
maze of rules for the allocation of expenses to a -particular invention.
It would be more logical to determine the duration of patent protection on the basis of the distinction between basic and
improvement inventions. Since research leading to a basic invention often is more costly and entails more risk of failure than
improvement research, the proposed distinction may indirectly
achieve the objective of rewarding monetary investment with
proportionate patent protection, thus crudely sorting out costly
inventions which would not be made without the prospect of a
long-term patent. The basic/improvement distinction offers the
practical advantage of being somewhat familiar to members of
the scientific community, whose informal judgments should be
a valuable source for filling in the content of the distinction.
The distinction between the two classes of patents should not
hinge on implicit conceptual differences, as it is difficult from a
technical standpoint to determine the degree of similarity between any invention and the prior art. Rather, the distinction
should be based upon different standards of nonobivousness and
the extent to which the invention advances the technology. Under such an approach, no new definitions would be needed for
improvement patents, since the present definition of nonobviousness could be used and no further requirement for technical advancement should be imposed. However, a different definition of nonobviousness would be needed to carve out a new
class of basic inventions.
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To obtain a basic patent, the inventor should be required to
show that the innovation represents a significant technical advance. This could be determined objectively by examining the
invention in relation to the prior art, without attempting subjectively to probe the inventor's mental processes. Evaluation
of technical progress should be based upon the scientific aspects
of the invention, not its commercial importance which might be
attributable to such totally different factors as extensive advertising, appealing design, superior manufacturing technique, and
ready access to markets. Because the scientific community often
makes this evaluation of innovations for a variety of purposes,
the opinion testimony of scientists would aid greatly in making
the decision and perhaps would serve to increase the predictability of decisions through the creation of a body of precedent.
The requirement for technical advance might also serve to select
a high percentage of the more costly innovations for longer-term
protection, at least where the research expenditures have been
made with a modicum of skill and judgment. Furthermore, it
would be more equitable to make the patent reward commensurate with the inventor's contribution to technical progress
and thus roughly proportionate to inventive ability. This approach may be more consonant with the patent clause of the
Constitution 9 than the present system, in that the duration of
the patent would depend upon the extent to which the progress
of science and the useful arts has been promoted.
In addition to the requirement for technical advance, a
higher standard of nonobviousness should be applied to innovations for which a basic patent is sought. One appealing way to
raise the standard of nonobviousness would be to require somewhat more than "ordinary skill" in the pertinent art.20 When
protection is being sought for a basic invention, the basis of skill
might be defined as the ordinary inventive skill of the scientist
engaged in research and the production of inventions in the pertinent art. Such a scientist is expected to have a modicum of
inventive skill even though he may never make a significant invention. While a high degree of creativity should be attributed
19. "The Congress shall have Power... [to promote the Progress
of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8.

20. In order for an innovation to be patentable under present law,
it must not "have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter

pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
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to the model scientist, the definition must stop short of circuitously defining the scientist as the one who makes basic inventions. Because there is some appreciation within the scientific community of the distinction between basic and improvement
inventions, it is more likely that there will be too many proposed definitions than too few.
The present definition of the "pertinent art" as that dealing
with the kind of problem which the innovation is designed to
solve 2' should continue to be applied to basic patents. This definition would be especially appropriate for basic patents in a
dual patent system, since the alternative definition of the art as
the industry for which the innovation is designed would often
be too narrow or even nonexistent for basic research which may
involve several scientific disciplines. Because the focus of basic
research is on problem solving, adoption of a problem-solving
definition may be essential to any attempt to increase the skilllevel standard.
With any definition of two classes of patents, the Patent
Office and the courts would have difficulty drawing a line that
could be followed with a high degree of reliability. Since the majority of "basic" and "improvement" inventions should be easy to
classify, however, drawing a line would be a problem with only
a small percentage of innovations, and even then no more difficult than the distinction presently required between obvious
and nonobvious innovations. Moreover, the economic consequences of the classification under the proposed system with its
"consolation prize" should be less severe than those which result under the present single-patent system.
If the proposed standards of patentability were followed,
the adoption of the system should not directly cause an increase
in the rate at which patents are issued. However, there is a risk
that the shorter term of the improvement patent would encourage examiners and courts to lower the standard for those patents. If the proposed legislation should fail to clearly condemn
this natural tendency, the resulting system might be more anticompetitive than the present system. Continuation of the present nonobviousness standard for improvement inventions would
make the examination of all applications imperative. A registration system involving no examination for nonobviousness
would be undesirable because of the great uncertainty concerning the validity of a patent prior to a judicial decision. Because
21. See Graham v, John ]Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 35 (1966).
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it would be more difficult to render reliable infringement advice to a manufacturer if claims of improvement patents were
not required to define precisely the metes and bounds of the
invention, the same standards of clarity and preciseness should
be required for both types of patents.
2. Single Embodiment Rule
Under present law, a patent is restricted to a single invention where "two or more independent and distinct inventions
are claimed in one application.

'22

Although this requirement

may be designed to produce more revenue by limiting examination to one invention per filing fee, 23 it may also simplify the
examination by focusing the search of prior -art. While this requirement should be maintained for both proposed classes of
patents, the improvement application should be further restricted
to a single embodiment of the invention. This would reduce
the scope of the prior art search and minimize the proliferation
of claims for the same improvement. An application with two
distinct embodiments might require far more time to search
than an application with only one. Examination of a multitude
of applications covering different embodiments of the same invention would be 'avoided by restricting the inventor of an improvement to patent protection for a single embodiment. This
would be a reasonable restriction, since two embodiments of an
improvement are not separate inventions even though different
from each other.
Under the present system, inventors of minor inventions
are often allowed claims, in either single or multiple applications,
covering several embodiments in two or more statutory classes.
This seems to be broader coverage than is deserved, as usually
only one embodiment constitutes the heart of the invention.
For example, the heart of the invention seldom resides in both
a new composition and the process for its preparation. Once
the composition is conceived, the process for its preparation us22. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1970). This section authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to restrict an application to a single independent and
distinct invention, and Patent Office Rule 141, 37 C.F.R. § 1.141 (1973),
prohibits claiming more than one independent and distinct invention in
one application. Patent Office Rule 142, 37 C.F.R. § 1.142 (1973), further
provides that "[ijf two or more independent and distinct inventions are
claimed in a single application, the examiner .. . shall require the applicant.., to elect that invention to which his claim shall be restricted
23. See Isaacs, Requirement for Restriction: Time for a Change?,
45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 442 (1963).
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ually involves only a slight modification of an existing process
and vice versa. If this conclusion is accurate, patent coverage
for more than one embodiment of an improvement improperly
extends the patent monopoly. The Constitution authorizes Congress to grant patents to "inventors" for their "discoveries"
rather than for all the subject matter related to their discoveries. 24 Where either a single patent contains A multitude of
claims or several patents cover different -aspects of the same invention, infringement opinions are complex and uncertain. Restricting the inventor of an improvement to a single embodiment
may reduce the unwarranted intimidation that minor patents
often exert on small unsophisticated manufacturers confronted
by such complexity and uncertainty. Since an inventor would
have to consider the patentability of all embodiments of his invention and select one of them for protection, the quality of
improvement patents should be increased by a single embodiment rule. The rule should not be detrimental to the inventor
who selects for protection the embodiment which appears to be
of the greatest commercial significance.
The single embodiment rule would prevent an inventor from
presenting in an application for an improvement patent claims
in different statutory classes, such as apparatus and process or
composition and process, or which differ greatly in scope, such
as genus and species or combination and subcombination. Although claims varying in scope of definition are usually essential
in providing adequate patent protection, satisfactory scope can
be achieved with one independent and a limited number of dependent claims.
An inventor should be required to elect the embodiment he
wishes to protect at the time of filing, and any subsequent application covering the same improvement should be rejected. Because he may not know which embodiment is of greatest commercial importance at the time he first files, the inventor should
be permitted to correct subsequently any error of judgment by
filing an application covering a different embodiment and abandoning the original application. Permitting only one application
per improvement to be pending at one time would reduce the
examination burden. Denying a substituted application the
benefit of the earlier filing date of the abandoned application
would discourage the inventor from changing the embodiment
originally selected, except where he has made a serious error of
judgment.
24. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:67

To implement the single embodiment rule, the patent examiner would be required to determine whether an application
covers more than one embodiment. This determination should
seldom be difficult if the applicant is restricted to a single independent claim and a limited number of dependent claims. As
under present law,25 each dependent claim should be required
to include all the limitations of the independent claim. To ensure that only one embodiment is claimed per application, all
dependent claims should be required to be in the same statutory
class as the independent claim. 26 In addition, a dependent claim
should not be permitted if it will require a separate prior art
search. 27 Adoption of these rules should minimize the occasions
when a difficult decision must be made as to whether more than
one embodiment is being claimed within the same application.
The single embodiment rule basically would require a determination of identity or nonidentity of invention between two
or more patents or applications.2 8 Since claims would be directed to embodiments rather than to the broader inventive concept, it would be necessary to examine the description in the
specifications to determine the invention, which often must be
done under present law to decide anticipation issues. The rule
of one embodiment per invention has much in common with the
double patenting prohibition. Each rule has a similar rationale,
in that the double patenting prohibition is designed to prevent
temporal extension of the patent monopoly while the single embodiment rule is designed to prevent scope extension. Both rules
apply only where the relevant patents or applications have a
common inventor. Like single embodiment, the issue of double
patenting hinges on a determination of the identity of invention,
although the task involves only a comparison of the claims. 29
Because of these similarities, it would be logical to turn to the
double patenting eases for guidance in refinement of the single
embodiment rule. For example, a holding of double patenting
between a patent and an application need not be based upon
25. Patent Office Rule 75(c), 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(c) (1973).
26. This is not required under present law. U.S. PATENT OFFICE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINlG PRocEDU= § 608.91(n), p. 48 (3d ed.

1961, rev. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MPEP].
27. A dependent claim which might require a separate search is
not improper under present law, but restriction may be required. Id.
28. Under present law, identity of invention between patents or
applications must be determined for purposes of anticipation, interference declarations, and double patenting. 4 A.
ENTS

§ 266, at 180-81 (2d ed. 1965).
29. Id.

DELLER, WALKER ON

PAT-
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identity of the claims, but may be based upon simply a lack of
patentable distinction between the claims in light of the prior
art.30 Only an improvement which is inventive over the first
patent may be the subject of a further patent. In the administration of the single embodiment rule, the issue of identity of
invention should likewise hinge on the presence or absence of a
patentable distinction between the two disclosures., This means
that the second application must cover a different improvement.
The fact that the two embodiments are in different statutory
classes should not compel the conclusion that they represent
separate inventions.
3.

Conversionand Simultaneous Application

In light of the lower standards of nonobviousness and the
shorter term recommended for improvement patents, it would be
natural for an examiner to allow claims of broader scope for an
improvement patent than for a basic patent. The development
of a great disparity in the breadth of claims allowed by the Patent Office for the two types of patents might induce many inventors of basic inventions to opt for an improvement patent,
especially if a basic patent should involve a longer delay. Too
great a disparity must therefore be prevented, as it could result
in disuse of the basic patent and thus deny many inventors of
basic inventions the patent protection proportionate to their
technical contribution. Such a development might also result
in the granting of improvement patents so broad as to stifle competition.
Flexibility in the conversion of an application filed for one
type of patent into an application for the other type would be
desirable, because at the time of filing it would be difficult to
predict which type of patent would be allowed by the Patent
Office. An applicant for a basic patent might be willing to
accept an improvement patent if his application is rejected by
the Patent Office. An applicant for an improvement patent
might similarly desire to convert to a basic patent, if he originally underestimates the significance of his invention. The conversion of either type of application seems unobjectionable so
30. Southern Implement 1fg. Co. v. McLemore, 350 F.2d 244 (5th
Cir. 1965); In re Ockert, 245 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1957); In re Asseff,
173 F.2d 253 (C.C.P.A. 1949); In re Fischer, 57 F.2d 369 (C.C.P.A. 1932).

See I.

SEIDmAN & L. HoRwiTz, PATENT OMCE RULES AND PRAcTIcE

§ 79.5,

at 269, 272 (rev. 1968) [hereinafter cited as SEmImAw & HORWITZ]. But
cf. Traitel Marble Co. v. U. T. Hungerford Brass & Copper Co., 22 F.2d
259 (2d Cir. 1927).
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long as the application being converted is still pending. Flexibility in conversion can be maximized if the formal requirements
for the claims and specifications in the two types of applications
are identical. A conversion fee can be used to discourage excessive conversion.
An applicant should also be permitted to file simultaneous
applications for both basic and improvement patents covering
the same invention. It is preferable that such an applicant have
the option of either leaving the improvement patent application
pending until a decision is made on the basic patent or seeking
the improvement patent first, perhaps to stop infringement.
Even an inventor who initially files only an application for a
basic patent should be allowed to subsequently file an application for an improvement patent to stop infringement, especially if consideration of the basic patent application is protracted. Although greater delay in the examination of applications for basic patents may be unavoidable, due to the more
rigorous examination demanded, potential injury from the extra
delay must be minimized, so that inventors of basic inventions
are not deterred from applying for basic patents.
If an improvement patent is issued while an application for
a basic patent covering the same subject matter is pending, the
subsequent grant of a basic patent should be conditioned on the
surrender of the improvement patent, and the expired portion
of its term should be subtracted from the term of the basic patent granted. An applicant should be permitted to obtain both
a basic patent and an improvement patent covering a single embodiment of a basic invention, except where this would result
in double patenting.3 1 This right should not add greatly to the
examination load, as only a small percentage of the total patents
issued are likely to be in the basic patent class and the inventor
could usually claim the embodiment in a basic patent alone, obtaining better protection at lower cost.
Some basic patents could be issued under the proposed system for inventions that the courts might later decide are entitled
only to the protection of an improvement patent, especially if
the courts continue to apply higher standards of patentability
than does the Patent Office. If the invention meets the stand31. Double patenting would not exist if the basic invention is
claimed in either the first application to be filed or the first application
to be granted. It would result only if the basic invention is claimed
in the application that is the second both to be filed and to be granted.
See SEmmAN & HoRwiTz, supra note 30, §§ 79.26-.30, at 295-305.
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ards of patentability for an improvement patent, a logical remedy
in such a case would be judicial conversion of the basic patent
into an improvement patent, with the expired portion of the basic
patent's term being deducted from the statutory term for the
improvement patent. Obviously, wher the determination is
made after the expiration of the statutory term for improvement patents, invalidity would be the only remedy.
The owner of a basic patent who doubts its validity might
want to convert it into an improvement patent. This would be
similar to the present practice of dedicating the remaining term
of a patent to the public. Voluntary conversion should be permitted on the same terms as judicial conversion. Once an applicant has accepted an improvement patent with no basic patent
application pending, however, he should not be permitted to convert the improvement patent into a basic patent, even with a
successful Patent Office examination, since such a conversion
would be unfair to parties who rely on the shorter term of the
protection. Any improvement patent issued where a basic patent
is pending should contain a notice of the pendency.

C. EFFECTS

OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM

The establishment of two classes of patents should improve
the sagging reputation of the patent system by reducing the gap
between Patent Office and judicial standards of patentability, a
gap which has rendered the patent validity opinions of even the
best attorneys little more than speculation in many cases. The
courts would be less inclined to invalidate a patent claiming a
minor invention when its term is commensurately short, and
examiners would tend to be more discriminating in granting
basic patents. Hopefully, the mean standard of patentability
would be raised under the proposed system by significantly improving upon the present standard for basic inventions without
lowering it for improvement inventions. Two classes of patents
with different terms would make it possible to grant a reward
that is more commensurate with the contribution of the inventor.
The basic aim of the patent system is to encourage inventing
by making it more profitable. This aim has been premised on
an uncritical subscription to the belief that it is impossible to
encourage too nuch investment of capital and talent in research activities. This uncritical thinking may be due to a belief that research must continue to develop marvelous new things
or to a fascination with research itself, as in the case of the
space program. More realistically, total investment in research
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ought to be subjected to the economic test that the projected
future net income, appropriately discounted for uncertainty and
the cost of opportunity capital, should be at least equal to the
original investment.32 Admittedly, such a calcuation is difficult,
due to the unpredictability of research success, but failure to
attempt a rough guess can result in gross over- or under-investment in research. It is easy to forget that investment in research competes with all other investment opportunities, and
that excessive investment in research may divert too much of
the nation's resources and talent from such other activities as
education which also contribute to progress. The author is not
suggesting that contemporary investment in research is necessarily disproportionate, but is raising these considerations simply
to place in proper perspective the choice that must be made between such investment and other activities.
Even if consensus could be reached on the total amount of
innovative effort which is desirable, the effect of a dual patent
system, or any reform of patent standards, would depend on the
elasticity of the supply of commercial innovative effort to
changes in patent protection. A decrease in protection may discourage innovation, while an increase may be costly to the consumer in the form of higher prices.
There is reason to think that the elasticity of innovative
supply is relatively low. In any event, it would be most difficult
to sort out those types of innovations that are directly influenced by changes in patent protection. Certain types of innovations are not motivated by the patent system; many occur
spontaneously3 3 or in response to an immediate need. Because
of competitive drive and the tax advantages of research deductions, the research activities of large corporations may not be
greatly influenced by a change in the degree of patent protection
afforded. The innovator's headstart advantages, such as reduced
production costs or increased demand for the innovation, also
provide incentive for investment in research.3 4 An improvement can usually be rapidly put to use in the production of an
existing product and its secrecy can be preserved at least until
the product is marketed. As a result, the first user may enjoy
a significant headstart over competitors, regardless of patent
protection. Even after the marketing of a product utilizing the
32. Kahn, The Ro7e of Patents,in CoaZmroN CARTms AND THEm
308, 313 (J. Miller ed. 1962).
33. Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,
1 EcoNo JscA (n.s.) 30, 33 (1934).
34. Lovett, supranote 8, at 1, 48, 55.
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improvement, there may be considerable delay before competitors
are able to duplicate the improvement. This is particularly
true where the improvement relates to the production process
and is difficult to duplicate on the basis of an examination of
the product alone.
Unfortunately, headstart advantages may most frequently
accrue to well-established firms with ample resources. In addition, the impact of headstart advantages upon investment in
research may not be very great because the investor can only
guess whether his headstart advantages will enable him to recoup his research costs. Thus, while the total research effort
of large corporations may not be greatly influenced by changes
in patent protection, care must be exercised not to discourage
investment in particular long-term, risky projects. On the other
hand, patent protection may be a much more general motivating factor for the individual inventor and the small corporation.
The immediate impact of increasing quality control in the
patent process would be to divert innovative effort from projects for which patent protection cannot be obtained to projects
for which it is available. Obviously, it would result in a wiser
utilization of research resources if the diversion were from projects to develop trivial innovations to more important research
efforts. Society should pay a greater price for -a greater contribution. Granting less patent protection for trivial innovations
would also reduce the amount of socially wasteful "inventing
around" such innovations by competitors.
Diversion of investment from trivial to more important and
therefore better protected innovations might not be very great
in the case of an investor who cannot accurately predict his
headstart advantages until the research project nears completion. Nevertheless, if inducement of investment in research is
a function of the patent system, adequate patent protection
should be provided for important innovations where the investor
possesses no significant headstart advantages and must incur
significant costs of commercial development not incurred by
later entrants. Unless the commercial development can be patented or kept secret, as with certain types of commercial processes, later entrants can freely share the benefit of the development by incurring only the costs of production and distribution.
A shorter term for improvement patents would still, in general, enable investors to recoup their research and development expenses, since the development costs for improvement innovations are likely to be less than for basic inventions and thus
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recoverable in a shorter time. Also, improvement inventions can
generally be put into production sooner, with a smaller capital
outlay than basic inventions, and with significant headstart advantages over competitors. Furthermore, investors frequently
may be able to recoup their development investment solely from
improvements in the product or the benefits of lower production costs, even where there are no headstart advantages. An
improved product may generate increased demand, while lower
production costs may permit producers to lower their prices
to take advantage of any significant elasticity of demand. These
benefits would be shared by all firms that are able to increase
their production and retain their share of the market. Even if
the demand for the product is inelastic, lower production costs
can be translated into higher unit profits, which also benefit all
firms using the improvement. There are usually fewer market
risks with an improvement than with a basic invention, since an
improvement involves a product that is already in the marketplace. Producers may invest in improvement research simply
to avoid being outstripped by competitors. Thus, the present
17-year term may not be a necessary incentive for improvement
research, -and substitution of a shorter term should not be expected to unduly discourage beneficial research.
A shorter term for an improvement patent would enable
competitors to use the patented improvement earlier and thereby
reduce the anticompetitive impact of the patent grant, while
still preserving for the patent owner a headstart over his competitors. Under the present system, the author suspects that a
significant percentage of patents of doubtful validity could be
classified as improvement patents. Even a patent of doubtful
validity and importance may sometimes keep competitors in
line and deter firms, particularly small firms, from entering
the field. Admittedly, a single improvement patent is usually
of little competitive significance unless it provides strong patent
protection for a commercially important invention. It is quite
likely, however, that the competitive power of a firm increases
faster than the mathematical increase in the size of its improvement patent portfolio. This synergistic effect may have significant adverse ramifications for competition within an industry.
It may enhance the strength of a portfolio of weak improvement
patents so that even strong firms are deterred from entering the
field, and may provide the cement for building a loosely knit
cartel based upon extensive licensing of the portfolio. Using a
number of license restrictions, such as the nonexclusive grant-
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back clause and the field of use limitation, the owner would be
able to tighten his control of the cartel without violating the
antitrust laws. Although the licensor and licensees may recognize the mutual advantages of exercising restraint in price competition, the royalties received from licensing would give the portfolio owner a competitive edge even in the absence of such cartelization effects. In addition, widespread licensing of the portfolio
may discourage "inventing around" research by the licensees; it
may be more profitable and less risky for competitors simply to
accept a license. The accumulation of additional improvement
patents from the portfolio owner's own research activities and
from his licensees by operation of grant-back clauses may perpetuate his control of the market. These anticompetitive effects
cast doubt upon the commonly held assumption that competition is fostered by licensing and suggest that additional legal
limitations upon licensing may be in order.3 5 However, some of
these anticompetitive effects could also be reduced by adoption
of the proposed patent system. The shorter term for the improvement patent should mean that its adverse effects would
be felt for a shorter period of time and that it would be more
difficult to put together a large portfolio of such patents.
The tendency of the proposed system to stimulate competition should not be overstated. At present, competitors often
succeed in "inventing around" many patented improvements
within a time shorter than any realistic term for improvement
patents. Other patented improvements frequently become obsolete because the basic invention has been displaced by another basic invention. License offers would become more attractive to competitors compared to the "inventing around" alternative, because royalties would be paid over a shorter period
under the improvement patent. However, it is doubtful that
there would necessarily be increased licensing, since the prospect
of decreased royalties might make exclusive exploitation more
attractive to the owners of improvement patents. By refusing
to grant licenses, the patentee might retain some headstart advantages even when the patent expires. Under the present
system, the owner of a patent covering an improvement seldom
retains any significant advantage after expiration, as the improvement is likely to be obsolete after 17 years.
The inventor of an improvement invention should be able
to obtain patent protection more rapidly than at present, since
35. See Marquis, Limitations on Patent License Restrictions: Some
Observations,58 IOWA L. Rnv. 41, 43-48 (1972).
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examiners would tend to be less dilatory in examining applications for patents of a shorter term. Although the more rapid
granting of improvement patents might deter competitors from
using the improvement when it first appears on the market, the
earlier expiration of the patent will bar them from the field for
a shorter time. Under the present system, competitors are reluctant to use a new improvement upon which a patent application has been filed without first obtaining a license, because
they may eventually be excluded by the issuance of a patent.
A competitor who has made substantial investment and commitment in the invention is in a poor bargaining position to obtain
a license on favorable terms after a patent is issued. The tooling
expenses necessary to use the improvement and the lost sales
when its use must be stopped can easily outweigh any gain from
its temporary use. Under these circumstances, the patent owner
may have effective patent protection for longer than the 17year term. While the proposed system would not eliminate this
problem, it would reduce the duration of the exclusion in the
case of improvement inventions.
The proposed system should reduce the search and examination load on the Patent Office, primarily by virtue of the
single embodiment rule, and should permit greater concentration on the examination of applications for the longer-term basic
patents. The simplicity of the improvement patent application
should lead to reduced attorneys' fees for filing and prosecution.
This result would be especially beneficial to the independent inventor, who has been hardest hit by the rising costs of patent
prosecution.
H1.

CITATION PERIOD

The constantly increasing deluge of patent applications upon
an inadequately staffed Patent Office has inevitably increased
the number of patent applications which are not subjected to a
thorough search and examination of prior art. Consequently,
the most pertinent prior -art sometimes is either overlooked or
improperly applied, resulting in the issuance of a patent of
doubtful validity. Indeed, courts often invalidate patents on
the basis of prior art that was not cited by the Patent Office. 30
Although the validity of any patent is subject to attack in the
courts, the attack must be made at the expense and inconven36. Hearings on the American Patent System Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,84th Cong., 1st Sess. 185 (1955).
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ience of a potential or actual infringer. A patent of doubtful
validity is thus a weapon its owner can use to intimidate his
competitors, especially weaker firms, during the patent's existence. The weapon is often available for the entire 17-year
term, in the absence of validity litigation. The significant number of patents held invalid by the courts is convincing evidence
of the poor quality control which brings discredit upon the patent
system.
In recognition of the technical expertise of competitors in
the field, some countries have provided them with an incentive
to discover pertinent prior art during the examination process.
These countries have established an opposition procedure which
allows any interested party to attack a patent within the patent
office shortly after the claims have been found allowable. 37 Although the procedure varies, it generally commences when the
patent office publishes in the official patent journal a report of
claims that have been found allowable and notice that 'copies of
the patent are available to the public. 38 Any interested person
has a short time in which to file an opposition petition, on
grounds basically identical to those the patent office itself can
assert against the issuance of a patent.3 9 The filing of this peti37. Opposition proceedings are used in Australia, Austria, Brazil,
Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Union of South Africa, and several other

countries.

STAFF op SUBCOmm. ON PATENTS, TRADEMAiS, AND CopyRIGHTS OF THE SENATE CoIm. ON THE JuDIcIARY, 84Ta CONG., 2D SESS., OPPOSITION AND REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS IN PATENT CASES 1 (Comm. Print
1957) [hereinafter cited as OPPosITIoN STUDY]. For discussions of oppo-

sition proceedings see Reichel & Frishauf, Opposition Proceedings in the
German Patent Office in Light of the Sixth Transfer Law Effective July
1, 1961, 44 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 52 (1962); Stuart-Prince, Patent Oppositions in Great Britain,40 J. PAT. Orr. Socy 769 (1958); Zentner, Opposition and the Validity of Patents in the English Speaking Countries, 40
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 47 (1958).
38. OPPOSITION STUDY, supra note 37, at 2. Patent opposition procedure is similar to that used in oppositions in trademark cases before
the United States Patent Office. Under the latter procedure, a mark
is published in the Official Gazette of the Patent Office once it has been
found to be entitled to registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (a) (1970). Any
person who believes he would be damaged by the registration may file
an opposition petition stating the grounds therefor within 30 days
after publication. 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1970). The procedure is similar
to civil trial procedure except that the proceedings are usually conducted by correspondence and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
decides the case by deposition. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.101-.106, 2.117-.136
(1973).
39. OPPosmIoN STUDY, supra note 37, at 2. In Germany any person
may raise an objection. In Great Britain, the challenger must have a
real and substantial interest, 14. at 4, 8,
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tion institutes an inter partes proceeding in which the applicant
has the right to answer and each party is permitted to present
evidence. The procedure is similar to the interference procedure
used in the United States.40 The decision is usually made on
the basis of the written opposition petition and affidavits rather
than testimony before the body that decides the issue.4 1 The
opposition is frequently based on prior art not cited by the examiner, but issues such as prior public use can also be raised in
some countries. 42 If the patent office sustains the opposition, it
may require cancellation or modification of the claims. Opposition
proceedings do not delay the patentee's protection in most countries since, even though he cannot bring an infringement suit
until a patent is granted, he is entitled to damages for any in43
fringement during the pendency of the opposition.
While the opposition procedure clearly strengthens the validity of the patents issued, it adds to the applicant's prosecution
costs and increases the work load of the patent office. More
importantly, it has been suggested that the opposition procedure is frequently used by corporate giants against patents in
which they have an interest, with the effect of making it more
difficult and costly for small firms to obtain patents. 4 Oppositions have also reportedly been instituted to coerce an applicant into licensing the opposer in exchange for dropping the opposition.45 In such a case, the patent office may continue the
opposition, but without the opposer's technical expertise and usually with less vigor. These objections, and the American experience with cumbersome interference proceedings,4" have
thwarted the adoption of a formal opposition procedure in the
United States.
Under present Patent Office regulations, anyone may cite
prior art pertinent to any pending application. 4 7 This is rarely
40. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1970); Patent Office Rules 201-87, 37 C.F.R.

§§ 1.201-.287 (1973).

41. OpposrrIoN STUDY, supra note 37, at 4 (England), 9 (Germany).
However, German procedure permits the patent section that decides the
case to summon and hear the parties and order the examination of witnesses. There may be few occasions to resort to this procedure, as most
oppositions are based on prior printed publications. Id. at 8-9.
42. Id. at 5 (England), 8 (Germany).
43. E.g., id. at 3 (England), 8 (Germany).
44. Stuart-Prince, supra note 37, at 789.
45. Reichel &Frishauf, supra note 37, at 61.
46. STAFF OF SuBcommn. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS
OF THE SENATE Comm. ON THE JUDIcaRy, 84TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE PATENT
SYSTEM

AND THE

MODEmN ECONOMY 65 (Comm. Print 1957).

47. See Patent Office Rule § 291, 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (1973); MPEP,
supra note 26, § 1309.02, at 228.1-2.
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done, however, except where there has been an interference, because the Patent Office is required to preserve the secrecy of
the application. 48 Furthermore, a person with relevant knowledge may be reluctant to cite prior art because of doubt as to
whether it would receive careful consideration late in the prosecution stage. "To increase the likelihood that all pertinent prior
art is considered before issuance of a patent ...

,"49

the Presi-

dent's Commission on the Patent System recommended the publication of all applications and the adoption of a citation period
of six months following publication. During this period anyone,
without regard to standing, could cite any prior patents or publications to be considered by the Patent Office in ex parte reexamination proceedings with the applicant. 50 In addition, the
citation period would make the issuance of a patent known to
those who might wish to initiate inter partes proceedings 5' to
determine whether there has been public use or sale to bar the
issuance of a patent.5 2 Knowledge of the application would undoubtedly result in increased use of this presently rarely used
procedure. 53 Since the citations would be used in the continuation of ex parte proceedings with the applicant, citation or failure
to cite would not preclude a subsequent challenge by an actual
or potential infringer.
The Patent Reform Acts of 196754 and 196955 (both unenacted) incorporated the Commission's recommendation of a citation period, but authorized the Commissioner of Patents to fix
the term between three and six months after publication of the
application. A bill introduced by Senator McClellan in 1969
extended the proposed citation period to one year commencing
when the patent is issued.5 6 Thus infringers would be liable
during the citation period if the patent should be upheld. Despite some opposition by the patent bar and industry, whose
48. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
49. PRESIDENT'S Comm~nssioN ON

THE PROGRESS

OF

. ..

THE PATENT SYSTEM,

UsEFUL ARTS 23 (1966)

To PROMOTE

[hereinafter cited as

PRESDENT'S CoiMISSION].
50. Id.
51. Patent Office Rule 292, 37 C.F.R. § 1.292 (1973).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
53. See Hearings on S. 2, S. 1042, S. 1377, S. 1691 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents,Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 185 (1967).
54. S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 136 (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 136 (1967). These identical bills were introduced by
the Administration in both houses on the same day.
55. S. 1569, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 136 (1969).
56. S.1246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 191 (1969).
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major objection was the possibility of more frequent public
use proceedings, 57 the Patent Reform Act of 197158 (unenacted)
retained the proposal but fixed the citation period at six months
after issue of a patent.
This proposal, with a few refinements, is equally desirable
under the present system and as an ingredient of the proposed
basic/improvement patent system. To discourage the indiscriminate filing of citations and to recoup a portion of the reexamination costs, a small fee could be charged. It is preferable that
the time period for presenting citations be short (e.g. three
months) to minimize the period of uncertainty concerning the
status of the patent. Any injury to the patentee due to the delay involved in the period of citation and reexamination could
be reduced by issuing the patent at the time of publication, subject to cancellation or modification in the event of reexamination.59 Unlike mere publication, issuance of the patent would
permit the patentee to recover for any infringement during the
citation and reexamination period in the event the patent is sustained, although infringement suits would be barred until reexamination is completed.
In recognition of the limitations of the ex parte reexamination procedure for resolving controverted factual issues and in
an effort to keep the procedure simple -and expeditious, citations
should be limited to prior art not cited by the examiner. Such
limitation can be effective only if the institution of public use
proceedings in the Patent Office is not permitted after publication of the patent. Otherwise, publication would provide the
knowledge of pendency essential to those who wish to institute
public use proceedings. In any event, there is little reason to
retain public use proceedings, which are rarely used anyway.
Courts which hear the witnesses testify are better suited for
resolving controverted factual issues than the Patent Office,
where the case is decided on the basis of depositions.6 0
In order to keep the reexamination procedure simple, a citation should be evaluated by the examiner handling the application. If he should determine that a citation is meritorious, it
could be incorporated into a reexamination office action and for57. E.g., Hearings on S. 2, S. 1042, S. 1377, S. 1691 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents,Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 185 (1967) (statement
of State Bar of Texas).
58. S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 191 (1971).
59. This is the procedure proposed in the Patent Reform Act of

1971. Id.

60, Patent Office Rule 272, 37 C.F.R. § 1.272 (1973).
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warded to the applicant, who could respond in a manner similar to a regular office action and would have the usual right of
appeal. Permitting the citator to intervene in the proceedings
would probably make them too complex and expensive. If the
examiner should decide that the citation is not meritorious, he
should terminate the reexamination proceedings. A revised
patent must be published if any of the claims are modified or
cancelled, and the disposition of all proceedings should be published in the Official Gazette.
Few citations will be made if infringers, who have the greatest incentive and expertise, are discouraged from making them.
Thus it may be necessary to preserve the anonymity of citators,61
so that potential or actual infringers will freely provide citations
without fear of inviting a later infringement investigation by a
successful patentee.
Knowledge of the identity of the citator might aid the patentee in strengthening the claims of his patent, as well as in
pursuing infringement litigation. Thus there is a risk that potential citators will be reluctant to use the citation procedure,
because they would lack the opportunity to answer the patentee's response and because citation would afford the patentee
the opportunity to put his claims in better shape to withstand
subsequent validity attacks. However, it would be much cheaper
for a potential citator to use this procedure than to wait to attack the patent through litigation. There is a lesser risk that
examiners would rely upon citators rather than conduct careful
searches themselves, but this can be controlled by administrative
supervision and by the examiner's natural incentive to locate the
relevant prior art without assistance. The success of the citation
procedure could also be jeopardized by the examiner's reluctance to admit his failure to find the relevant citation, but it may
be less embarrassing at the reexamination stage than if the citation is the basis for a subsequent judicial holding that the patent
should not have been granted. The validity of these fears can
only be tested by the adoption of the procedure. However, one
must be willing to abandon it if it proves to be of little value.
The adoption of a citation period might further the policy
of keeping invalid patents out of the channels of commerce.
This policy can be more efficiently pursued by improving the
61. Anonymity of citators was recommended by the PRsmENT's
ColnmssIo, supra note 49, at 23, and has been incorporated in the unenacted Patent Reform Acts. E.g., S. 1569, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 136
(1969).
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quality of the examination process in the Patent Office than by
encouraging subsequent validity litigation. 62 Even though fewer
invalid patents might be challenged in the courts as a result, the
legal presumption of validity of patents need not be strengthened, since the citation process would likely have been used with
only a small percentage of invalid patents.
1I1. CANCELLATION AND REVOCATION PROCEDURES
While the adoption of a citation procedure would improve
the quality of examination and thus decrease the number of
invalid patents issued, its effectiveness would depend upon the
existence of interested parties during the citation period. It
certainly could not ensure that the issuance of an invalid patent
would be a rare occurrence. Although the invalidity of a patent
can be asserted as a defense when the patent owner alleges in0 3
fringement or seeks to collect unpaid royalties from a licensee,
the avenues for challenging a patent are somewhat limited in
the absence of litigation commenced by the patent owner.
A.

CuRRmET PROCEDUlRE

FOR CHALLENGING DOUBTFUL PATENTS

An alleged infringer does not have to wait for the patent
owner to bring an infringement action against him but can instead seek a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid or,
if valid, that he is not infringing it.6 4 However, in order to meet
the case or controversy requirement, the person bringing the
declaratory action must be an interested party 5 subjected to a
sufficient threat of infringement litigation.60 Active production
of the article alleged to infringe or active preparation for its
production satisfies the standing requirement, but mere consideration of the advisability of commencing production is probably
insufficient. 67 Thus, a potential infringer may have to make a
62. The Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 764 (1969) endorsed a "strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas
in the public domain" in repudiating the licensee-estoppel doctrine and
thus encouraging validity attacks.
63. A patent licensee is no longer estopped from challenging the
validity of a patent under which he is licensed in a suit brought by the
licensor for unpaid royalties. Id. at 661-74.
64. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). For a discussion of the declaratory
action, see E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 102 F.2d 105 (6th
Cir. 1939).
65. See Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 439
F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1971).
66. Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1941).
67. See Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 439
F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1971) (manufacture and token sale of 100 plastic con-
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substantial financial commitment before being able to litigate
the validity of a blocking patent or its applicability to the article in question. An adjudication before any financial commitment is made might prevent substantial economic waste and useless expenditure of money.6 8 On the other hand, the standing
requirement should not be liberalized to the point where potential infringers can 'harass the patent owner by forcing him to
continously defend his patent. 69 This is the main objection to
permitting suit by someone who is merely contemplating the
manufacture of the article in question. A satisfactory balance
between these opposing interests could be achieved by granting
standing to a party who can prove that he would produce the
article but for the blocking patent. The potential infringer
should not be permitted to bring an action until he has settled
upon plans to produce a definite embodiment of the patented
invention. Otherwise, the validity issue would be moot and the
applicability of the patent could not be determined. This prerequisite should be an adequate safeguard against easy judicial
acceptance of self-serving statements of a potential infringer's
intention.
Since the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act,7 0 the
range of conduct legally sufficient to constitute a threat has been
expanded by the courts to include implied and indirect threats7'
and infringement charges against customers of the party seeking the declaratory judgment.7 2 Nevertheless, the requirement
tainers in question with contingent plans for further production held insufficient). See also Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d
87 (2d Cir. 1963), which established the test that "[m]ajor stress should
be placed on the 'definite' intention of the plaintiff to take 'immediate'
action to utilize its potential and this intention should be 'evident' from
the preparatory steps outlined in its complaint," and found that the
manufacture of a single necktie and its submission to the patent owner
for an infringement opinion was not sufficient to meet the test. For

further discussion, see 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE % 57.20 (2d ed.
1972).
68. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 807 (2d ed. 1941).
69. Id.
70. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
71. 6A J.MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
57.20 (2d ed. 1972). Dewey
& Almy Chem. Co. v. American Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 761 (1943) carried the indirect threat concept quite far
in finding a sufficient threat to plaintiff in defendant's infringement
against another firm using the same type of process as the plaintiff,
even though the defendant denied knowledge that the plaintiff was using the process in question. For a criticism of this case, see Kreiger,
The Federal DeclaratoryJudgments Act as it Applies to Patent Actions,
52 J.PAT. OFF.Soc'y 440, 448-49 (1970).
72. Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1941)
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of threat of infringement action is still a significant impediment to a declaratory action, since the patent owner can avoid
the action by simply refraining from giving any indication of a
threat. For example, a potential infringer might try to force a
response from the patent owner by sending him a description or
prototype of the article he plans to make and requesting the
patent owner's views on whether the article infringes the patent.
If the patent owner simply refuses to state a position, the potential infringer is frustrated in that he has received neither a sufficient threat to bring an action nor a statement of noninfringement that permits him to safely commence production. Under
these circumstances, the case or controversy requirement should
be considered satisfied if there is a serious question whether the
patent covers the article. Deciding this issue as a preliminary
matter would be no more difficult than determining whether a
sufficient threat has been made. It is hardly an unfair imposition upon the patent owner to require him to defend his patent
once a serious question has been raised concerning its applicability and 'he has refused to state his position, especially when
he enjoys a patent monopoly granted by the government. The
prerequisite of a serious applicability question should provide
the patent owner with adequate protection -against undue harassment; in addition, the courts can prevent abuse by exercising their discretion to refuse to entertain -declaratory actions.7 3
Considerable support for liberalizing the case or controversy
requirement in patent cases can be found in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins. 74 In that case the Court held that the licensee-estoppel
doctrine, which 'had prevented licensees from challenging the
validity of the patents under which they were licensed, must
yield to the "important public interest in permitting full and
free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part
of a public domain." 75 The Court observed that licensees are
often the only parties with sufficient economic incentive to challenge the validity of patents. 7 6 Potential infringers are the only
other group which may 'have such an economic incentive and,
in fact, are the only group in the case where the patent is not
licensed.
The policy adopted in the Lear case can be carried out only
(indirect threat of suits for contributory infringement made to purchasers of article in question from plaintiff held sufficient threat).
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
74. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
75. Id. at 670.
76. Id.
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if the courts refuse to impose a stringent case or controversy
requirement upon a licensee who brings a declaratory action
challenging either the validity of the patent or its applicability
to the article he is producing. The same "interested party"
standards ought to be imposed upon a licensee as upon an alleged infringer, because the mere existence of a license does not
mean that the licensee is necessarily producing the article.
The presence of an actual controversy between the parties about
either the validity or the applicability of the patent should
substitute for an adequate infringement charge,77 as it is preferable that the controversy be settled prior to the accrual of damages or termination of the license. Such a controversy exists
when the licensor disputes the licensee's contention that he does
not owe royalties because the patent is either invalid or inapplicable. Insisting that an "actual" charge of infringement be
made by the licensor would compel the licensee to take the risky
step of repudiating the license so he could bring suit. This would
conflict with the Lear policy of removing the barriers to challenges by licensees.
Even with liberalized standing requirements, licensees may
be reluctant to attack the validity of patents under which they
are licensed, since success also frees unlicensed competitors to
use the invention. Thus, the only way to implement the Lear
policy of clearing invalid patents from the channels of commerce
77. American Mach. & Metals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Impeller Co.,
166 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1948). In Medtronic, Inc. v. American Optical
Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Minn. 1971), the court held that the licensee's declaratory action was justiciable because threats by the licensor
and his right to terminate the license at any time created the prerequisite reasonable apprehension of liability on the part of the licensee. The
court rejected the licensor's contention that because of the license there
would not be the charge of infringement which was essential to justiciability. Id. at 1333. The policy of the Lear case that patent validity
should be open to challenge by licensees was relied upon by the court
in holding the controversy justiciable. Id. at 1331. But see Thiokol
Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 253 (D. Del. 1970),
afid, 448 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1971), in which a federal court declined
jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory action brought by a licensee prior
to the termination of the license because he was basically seeking to
have the federal court declare that he had a valid defense to any action
by the licensor under state law to collect unpaid royalties. The court
thought that a charge of infringement was essential to federal jurisdiction and that there could be no charge prior to termination or repudiation of the license. Id. at 255. In a later declaratory action involving
the same parties, Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 319 F.
Supp. 218 (D. Del. 1970), affd, 448 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1971), the court
held it had jurisdiction on the ground that the legal barrier to an
infringement charge was removed by the licensee's termination of the
license prior to bringing suit,
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may be to reduce the legal impediments to challenges by potential infringers, the only other group with sufficient economic
incentive.
Although neither the present patent law78 nor its predecessors
authorized the government to sue to cancel invalid pat79

tents, the Supreme Court in 1888 recognized the government's
right to maintain an action in equity to cancel a patent procured
through fraud. 8 The Court recognized the need for a remedy
equivalent to the English writ of scire facias8 1 and relied upon
the government's analogous right to set aside a land patent obtained by fraud. In a later suit against the same patent owner,s2
the Court indicated that the government would not have standing to challenge the validity of a patent on other grounds, which
would have been available to a private party. The Court saw
no need for a collateral attack upon the judgment of the Patent
Office on grounds which any person could raise as a defense to
the assertion of the patent against him. The government has
brought very few suits to protect the public from fraudulently
procured patents and has apparently prevailed on the merits in
only one case. 83 The inactivity of the government may be due
to the difficulties of proving fraud by clear and convincing evi78. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
79.

The major prior patent acts were: Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230,

16 Stat. 198; Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, 12 Stat. 246; Patent Act of 1836,

ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318; Patent Act
of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
80. United States v. American Bell Tel Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
This right had been previously recognized in United States v. Gunning,
18 F. 511 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
81. This common law writ issued in the name of the king to revoke
charters and patents granted by false suggestion. 128 U.S. at 368-69.
82. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897).
83. The only reported case found in which a patent was cancelled

is United States v. Saf-T-Boom Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 283 (E.D. Ark.), affd
per curiam, 431 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1970). The court found that there
was either actual or constructive fraud by the applicant in filing a false

affidavit upon which the Patent Office relied in issuing a patent. One
other action is apparently still pending, United States v. Marifarms, Inc.,
345 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1972) (motion to stay action denied). In all
the other reported cases found, the government apparently failed to obtain cancellation of the patent. United States v. Standard Elec. Time
Co., 155 F. Supp. 949 (D. Mass. 1957), appeal dismissed, 254 F.2d 598
(1st Cir. 1958); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 73 F. Supp. 979
(D. Del. 1947); United States v. Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp.
127 (N.D. Ohio 1945), affd, 164 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1947); Attorney Gen.
ex tel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works, 32 F. 608 (C.C.D.R.I. 1876)
(defective because United States not a named party); United States v.
Frazer, 22 F. 106 (N.D. Ill. 1884); United States v. Gunning, 18 F. 511
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
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dence.8 4 It is also difficult for the government to prove the
elements of fraud: that the applicant both intended to deceive
and knowingly misrepresented a material fact which induced
the Patent Office to grant the patent.8 5 Consequently, this remedy has been of little significance in protecting the public from
invalid patents.
While the government can challenge the validity of a patent involved in an illegal restraint of trade and seek to have it
cancelled,8 6 this method of attack is ancillary to an antitrust
action and thus can be used only under limited circumstances.
It has been held that the use of a fraudulently obtained patent
to exclude competition is an unfair method of competition under
section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act,87 and that

the Federal Trade Commission has the authority to order compulsory licensing of any such patent. 88 This authority has been
exercised only once, perhaps for the same reasons that there is
a dearth of direct governmental attacks upon fraudulantly procured patents. These two methods of attack are clearly of little
significance in the elimination of invalid patents.
A provision permitting an individual to bring an action to
cancel a fraudulently procured patent was included in the Patent
Act of 179089 but was deleted by the Patent Act of 1836,90 which
included several statutory defenses to an infringement action.9 1
An individual right of action has not been revived in subsequent
patent legislation. In 1871 the Supreme Court decided that this
omission precluded a private party from maintaining an action
84. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 251
(1897).
85. United States v. Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp. 127, 140
(N.D. Ohio 1945), affd, 164 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1947).
86. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973) (govern-

ment challenge to the validity of patents involved in an antitrust violation permitted even though defendant did not rely on the patents as
a defense).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
88. American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
The defendant was subsequently ordered to license the patent at a royalty no higher than 2.5 percent of the licensee's net sales. American Cyanamid Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (FTC Complaints and Orders) %18,077, at 20,504, 20,522 (FTC 1967), aff'd, Charles
Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
920 (1969).
89. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 111 (1790). This
provision was included in the Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 10,
1 Stat. 323 (1793), unchanged except that the period for challenge,
was increased from one to three years after the issuance of a patent.
90. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.

91. Id. ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 121.
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to cancel a fraudulently procured patent. 92 The Court reasoned
that the government was the logical party to bring a cancellation suit, since a private action would only bind the parties to
93
the suit and would not cancel the patent as to other parties.
In this regard, the Court's reasoning was faulty because it is
inherent in the cancellation remedy that it be universally binding regardless of the parties. The Court was also concerned that
a lack of universal binding effect might subject a patentee to
vexatious suits even after a determination that the patent is
valid. This concern may be unwarranted, as the persuasiveness
of a well reasoned degision upholding a patent should deter most
potential challengers. In any event, revival of the private right
to bring a cancellation action would be of little practical significance unless it included grounds for challenge other than fraudulent procurement.
A final decision of patent invalidity in an infringement action is now nearly tantamount to cancellation of the patent. In
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,94 the Court held that a patent owner whose patent has
been adjudicated invalid in a prior infringement action is collaterally estopped from relitigating the validity against a different defendant, unless he can prove that he lacked a full and
fair opportunity to defend validity in the prior action. The
Court decided that the rigid mutuality of estoppel rule, which
permits a litigant to use a prior judgment only if he and the
other party were both parties in the first action, would no
longer be applied in patent infringement litigation. This decision falls short of creating a cancellation remedy in infringement litigation only to the extent that a patent owner is not
collaterally estopped if he does not have a satisfactory opportutunity to defend the patent in the first litigation. The Court said
that in the second trial the patent owner can question the first
court's understanding of the technical subject matter and the
correctness of the standard of nonobviousness it applied.)5 The
patent owner can also introduce new evidence or witnesses that
could not have been introduced in the first suit. Because the
courts should seldom require a complete trial to dispose of such
issues and because there appears to be no sound reason for not
applying collateral estoppel even when the second action is
92.
93.
94.
95.

Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 WaU) 434 (1871).
Id. at 441.
402 U.S. 313 (1971).
Id, at 333,
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declaratory, the Blonder-Tongue decision virtually creates a
private cancellation action wherever the case or controversy
requirement is met. While this decision will reduce relitigation
after a patent has been held invalid and represents a big step
towards the creation of a private cancellation remedy, the infringement or declaratory action approach still has limitations
which would not be present in a private cancellation action.

B. CANCELLATION OF PATENTS IN OTHER CouNTRIES
A number of countries have dealt with the problem of invalid patents by authorizing private parties to bring revocation
proceedings before the patent office.98 Such proceedings basically serve to extend the opposition period and can be brought
in most of these countries on any ground on which an opposition could have been brought, or if there is no opposition procedure, on any ground on which the original application could
have been rejected.9 7 Revocation proceedings are brought after
the patent has been granted but are otherwise similar to opposition proceedings. In some countries, the private revocation
action is brought in court rather than in the patent office.98
The highly developed British and West German revocation procedures could serve as models for adoption in the United States.
In the United Kingdom, any "person interested" who did
not oppose the grant of a patent may apply to the ComptrollerGeneral of Patents, within 12 months after sealing, for revocation
on any grounds upon which opposition could have been based. 99
This is essentially a belated opposition and follows a similar
procedure. 10 0 Evidence is generally limited to documents and
affidavits, but a right to an oral hearing exists.10 1 An additional
procedure enables any person interested to bring an action in
the High Court at any time during the life of a patent to revoke
96. Among the countries which provide for revocation proceedings
in the patent office are Austria, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Republic
of South Africa, and the United Kingdom. WORLD PATENT ITIGATION
(H. Durham ed. 1967). For a discussion of such proceedings, see OposrnoN STUDy, supra note 37, at 1-2.
97. OPposrroN STuDY, supranote 37, at 2.
98. Among these countries are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Nigeria, and Rhodesia. WORLD PATENT IaTIGATION (H. Durham
ed. 1967); BAxER, supra note 11.
99. The Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 87, § 33.
100. 29 HALsBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 92 (3d ed. 1960).
101. D. FALcONER, W. ALDous & D. YoUNG, TERRELL ON THE LAw
OF PATENTS 189-92 (12th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as FALCONER]. The
Comptroller has the power to take oral evidence and permit any witness
to be cross-examined on his affidavit. Id. at 192.
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it on any ground that would be a defense in an infringement
action. 10 2 As the proper course is to bring a revocation action,
103
an action seeking a declaration of invalidity cannot be brought.
While it is necessary to have a real and substantial interest to be
a "person interested,"' 04 this does not seem to be as onerous as
the standing requirement for federal declaratory actions in
the United States. The defendant in a British infringement
action may counterclaim for revocation. 0 5
In Germany, the only method of attacking a patent is a
nullity action before the Senate of Nullity in the Federal Patent
Court, 0 6 as the courts do not have jurisdiction to revoke a patent
in an infringement action' 0 7 and no alternative revocation procedures are available to private parties. Unlike the revocation
action before the Comptroller-General in the United Kingdom,
the German action may be brought at any time during the life
of the patent and can even be brought by a person who had
brought an opposition against the grant of the patent.
The German nullity procedure has served as a model to a
professional working party, appointed by the Commission of the
European Economic Community, in the preparation of a Draft
Convention Relating to a European Patent for the Common
Market. 0 8 Under this convention, a European patent system
102. The Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 87, § 32.

Such

an action may lie after the expiration of a patent. FALCONER, supra note
101, at 293.
103. North-fEastern Marine En'gr. Co. v. Leeds Forge Co., 23 Pat.
Cas. 529 (1906). See FALCONER, supra note 101, at 293.
104. FALCONER, supra note 101, at 169-70. The locus standi for revocation proceedings is the same as for opposition proceedings. The Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 ch. 87, § 14.
105. The Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 87, § 61.
106. M. Smwm's-,
EunoPN PATENT LAw Am PRAccrcE 609-10 (Practising Law Institute, Copyright, Trademark & Literary Property Transcript No. 5, 1971).
107. Id. If a nullity action is pending, the judge in an infringement

action involving the patent may suspend the proceedings until the nul-

lity decision is made. However, the judge in an infringement action in
regard to a Utility Model can decide upon its validity, since it is granted
without any examination on the merits. See text accompanying notes
10-13 supra.

108. Draft Convention Relating to a European Patent for the Com-

mon Market (unadopted) (1970). For English translation, see 2 CCH
Comn. MKT. REP. f 5751 et seq. (1971). This Convention is designed
to set up a single Community patent in the Common Market. It implements the more general provision of the First Preliminary Draft Con-

vention for a European System for the Grant of Patents (1970), which
would include European countries that are not members of the Common
Market. For English translation, see 2 CCH Coivnv. MkT. REP.
5678
et seq. (1971)

(Implementing Regulations to the Convention for a Euro-
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with its own patent office would be established to grant patents
effective throughout the Common Market. 0 9 Any interested
person could apply to the European Patent Office for the revocation of a Community patent" o on basically the same grounds
on which the grant of the patent could have been denied."'
The patent owner would be notified of the application and afforded an opportunity to submit his comments with regard to the
grounds asserted in the application. -2 If the application were
admissible, the Revocation Division of the Patent Office would
render a decision after examination and oral arguments." 3
C.

AMERICAN PRECEDENTS FOR CANCELLATIOI

Am REVOCATION PROCEDURES

Administrative revocation proceedings are not totally alien
to the American system. The Lanham Act provides for the cancellation of registered trademarks at the petition of a person
who is or will be damaged by continued registration." 14 Cancellation may be sought on any ground upon which registration
could have been refused, but the petition must be filed within
five years of registration as to marks registered on the principal
register," 5 except on such grounds as fraudulent procurement
or the mark's having become descriptive. The cancellation decision is made by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board," 0
which can read, but does not hear, the testimony of witnesses
taken by oral deposition with the right of cross-examination." 7
The decision may not be based entirely upon the written record,
pean System for the Grant of Patents). The working parties have prepared a Second Preliminary Draft Convention for a European System
for the Grant of Patents (1971). For English translation, see 2 CCH
Comm. MKT. REP. 7f 5503 et seq. (1971). The Second Preliminary Draft
has not yet been adopted by the International Patent Conference and

the Draft Convention Relating to a European Patent for the Common
Market has not been revised to reflect the changes made in the Second
Preliminary Draft.
109. Draft Convention Relating to a European Patent for the Common Market arts. 1-2 (unadopted) (1970). For English translation, see
2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. %5753-54 (1971).

110. Id. art. 54, 2 CCH Comnm. Mxc. REP. 7f 5806 (1971).

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. art. 52, 2 CCH Comnmi. MiT. REP. 7f 5804 (1971).

Id. art. 56, 2 CCH Comnv. MiT. REP.
5808 (1971).
Id. arts. 57-59, 2, CCH Comm. MiKT. REP. 771 5809-11 (1971).
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970).
Id. There is no time limit for marks registered on the supple-

mental register.
116.

Id. § 1067.

117.

Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 2.123 (1973).
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however, since the parties have the right to make oral arguments to the Board.118
There have been numerous proposals to introduce various
forms of cancellation proceedings into United States patent law.
One of the earliest proposals was the recommendation made in
1943 by the National Patent Planning Commission that any person be permitted to institute cancellation proceedings in the
Patent Office within six months after the grant of a patent." 9
The short time limitation would have made the proposed proceedings little more than a belated opposition. The House Judiciary Committee, in its work on the revision and codification
of the patent laws which resulted in the Patent Act of 1952,120
prepared a preliminary draft which included a proposal for patent revocation.' 2' This draft would have permitted the Patent
Office or any interested person to initiate revocation proceedings in the Patent Office within one year after the grant of
the patent. The one-year limitation would have seriously impaired the effectiveness of this procedure in eliminating invalid
patents. The draft also authorized courts to require a party attacking the validity of a patent to initiate revocation proceedings in the Patent Office within a period designated by the court
or abandon the validity issue. The Committee eventually deleted the revocation proposal, believing it to be too controver22
sial.'
In 1966, the President's Commission on the Patent System
recommended the creation of a procedure in the Patent Office
for the cancellation of claims in patents. 1 23 The Commission
considered this procedure to be faster and less expensive than
court proceedings. The Patent Reform Act of 1967 (unenacted)
adopted this recommendation in proposing that any person or
governmental department could petition the Patent Office within
three years after the issuance of a patent for the cancellation of
any of its claims on the basis of prior art. 24 If the Patent Office determined on the basis of the petition that a claim should
not have been allowed, the patentee would be notified and given
118. Id. § 2.128(c) -. 129.
119. NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING Co1mvi'N REPORT, THE A ERICAN
PATENT SYSTEM, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1943).

The Commission had been established by the President.
120. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
121. OPPosrTION STUDY, supra note 37, at 18-19.
122. Id. at 18.

123. PRnsiDiENT's COMMIssION, supra note 49, at 29.
124. S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 257 (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 257 (1967) (identical bills).
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an opportunity either to amend the claim or to seek reconsideration before the Patent Office Board of Appeals. The bill sought
to discourage the use of the procedure as a means of harassment
by providing for a $500 filing fee and authorizing the assessment
against an unsuccessful petitioner of the patent owner's reasonable expenses of defending the patent, including attorney's fees
of up to $1000. This procedure was proposed as a "poor man's
declaratory judgment action,' 112 5 but would have differed from
a judicial declaratory action in that the filing of the petition
would have simply initiated post-prosecution proceedings between the patent owner and the Patent Office, with the petitioner having no subsequent involvement. The ex parte nature
of these proceedings and their substantial cost might have led a
potential infringer to prefer the inter partes court challenge
where he would have a better opportunity to present his case.
Cancellation provisions have been omitted from recent patent re12 6
form bills.

D. A PROPOSAL FOR CANCELLATION AND REVOcATIOi PROCEDURES
Although inter partes cancellation procedures may generally
be patterned after the proposals in recent patent bills, the preferable forum for private cancellation actions may be the United
States district courts rather than the Patent Office. A court
which hears witnesses testify may be better suited for resolving
controverted factual issues than the Patent Office, which may
have to base its decision on depositions. The central location of
the Patent Office would make it difficult and expensive for the
parties to have the trial conducted there. In any event, it may
be preferable to interject the fresh viewpoint of the district
courts, which are less likely than the Patent Office to have
strongly held opinions about patent law concepts. Although
the Blonder-Tongue decision comes close to creating a private
cancellation remedy, 1 27 obstacles will most likely be encountered unless the action is specifically authorized in legislation.
The main difference between cancellation of a patent and an invalidity decision is that cancellation would conclusively bar the
patent owner from asserting the patent against another party
125. Hearings on Patent Law Revision Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 95 (1967) (testimony of Senator Rifkind,
Cochairman of the President's Commission on the Patent System).
126.

See, e.g., S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).

127. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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even if he could show that he did not have a satisfactory opportunity to defend the patent in the cancellation action. A
defendant in an infringement action ought to be permitted to
seek cancellation in a counterclaim. In other respects also the
proceedings for cancellation should be similar to invalidity proceedings, with liberalized standing requirements.
Since patents are granted as a result of examination by the
Patent Office, the Office has an interest in seeing invalid patents
revoked and should therefore be empowered to institute revocation proceedings. Indeed, the Patent Office may be more likely
than any other institution to receive information casting doubt
upon patents, primarily from third parties, but also from sources
within the Office. The expertise of the Patent Office could be
best utilized by conducting within the Office the proceedings
which it initiates. The creation of a continuous reexamination
procedure after the issuance of a patent could be avoided by
confining the grounds for revocation to those not raised in the
examination of the application. While the ground of nonobviousness ought to be considered a second time if the challenge
is based upon prior art not cited by the examiner in the original
application, neither a new method of applying prior art cited in
the examination nor any other new argument should be sufficient ground for revocation. Otherwise the revocation procedure
would create too much uncertainty about patents.
The fact that some patents are not commercially utilized
until late in their life and grounds for revocation may not be
promptly discovered weighs heavily in favor of permitting the
initiation of revocation proceedings in the Patent Office at any
time during the life of a patent. Firms that are in or are seriously considering entering the business to which the patent relates would be a prime source of revocation information, and a
time limitation would effectively bar a significant number of
revocation actions based on such information. There is a legitimate fear that an unlimited period would leave the status of
patents too uncertain and consequently would -discourage investment in and exploitation of the patent. However, that fear
no more justifies a time limitation on revocation proceedings
than on declaratory actions challenging validity, which similarly
make the status of patents less secure.
Revocation proceedings ought to correspond closely to the
proposed citation proceedings, in which the Patent Office would
also examine the challenge. Anyone, without regard to standing, should be allowed to bring prior art not cited in the original
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examination to the attention of the Patent Office. A small fee
charged for each complaint could partially cover the expense of
the proceedings and reduce the number of complaints filed for
harassment purposes.
Whether the source of revocation information comes from a
private complainant or is independently discovered within the
Patent Office, a revocation question initiated in the Patent Office could be best handled by the same division and preferably
the same examiner that examined the application. If the Patent
Office should determine that revocation is required, it could set
forth the reasons in an office revocation action with the usual
right of appeal. Regardless of how the proceedings are handled,
it is important that they be expedited to shorten the period of
uncertainty concerning the patent in question.
In a revocation proceeding, the patentee would best receive
the protection his invention deserves if he were allowed to
amend the claims or substitute new claims. Justice dictates,
however, that the patentee be barred from submitting broader
claims, since he had that opportunity when he filed the application and other parties might have relied in various ways on the
limitation of the patent to its original claims. On the other
hand, even challengers of patents which are upheld might benefit from amendments which clarify coverage or narrow the
scope to exclude prior infringing activity. While amendments
might strengthen the patentee's position in future court battles,
opponents of the amendment right can legitimately complain
only about the timeliness of such amendments. It might be
argued that the patentee should have submitted valid claims
during the original examination, but at least part of the "fault"
must be assigned to the examination process in the Patent Office.
Permitting complainants to intervene in Patent Office revocation proceedings would make them expensive and time-consuming and result in an increase in the period of uncertainty
about a patent. The creation of an inter partes judicial cancellation procedure would greatly reduce the need for such intervention. Moreover, because other parties might have revocation
information not already before the Patent Office, the institution
of Patent Office proceedings could be publicized to afford an
opportunity for such information to be brought to the attention
of the Office. To expedite the proceedings, only a short period
should be allowed for this purpose.
Unless the Patent Office adopts a costly periodic reexamina-
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tion program, it is unlikely that it will often discover grounds
for revocation on its own initiative. Consequently, the success
of the proposed revocation procedure may depend largely upon
the willingness of private parties to file complaints. Potential
complainants may be deterred for the same reasons as potential
citators if they cannot remain anonymous. Increasing the presumption of validity arising from a decision upholding a patent would deter a potential complainant because it would weaken
his case in a subsequent inter partes court challenge. Only a
slight increase in the presumption would be justified in any
event, since the Patent Office proceedings would not be inter
partes. Potential complainants should be informed of the disposition of the case. Indeed, the uncertainty created by the proceedings can only be terminated by publication of the outcome.
A Patent Office decision against revocation should not bar
an inter partes court challenge but should bar subsequent proceedings in the Office on the same issue or any other issue that
reasonably could have been presented in the first challenge. As
in the case of a holding of invalidity, either judicial cancellation
or revocation by the Patent Office should be retroactive to the
extent of barring a suit by the patentee for infringement or collection of royalties accruing prior to the time of the decision.
However, the legitimate financial planning of patentees would
be unduly disrupted by permitting licensees restitution of royalties already paid.
Adoption of the Patent Office revocation procedure should
help eliminate invalid patents and increase respect for the patents that survive the process. Because the revocation procedure would be relatively inexpensive to a complainant, it
could become a fairly effective "poor man's remedy," provided
that the proceedings are expedited. The efficacy of the procedure could be jeopardized if the Patent Office should be unwilling to admit error, but there is no reason to believe that
this would occur.
rV. CONCLUSION
Sympathy for inventors, the ex parte nature of the examination process, and a heavy work load have caused the Patent Office to apply a standard of invention approaching mere novelty.
Concern for the cost of the patent monopoly to consumers
has motivated the courts to apply a higher standard, resulting
in the invalidation of a significant number of patents and the
doubtful validity of many others. If one accepts the author's
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conclusion that the Patent Office grants many patents for trivial
innovations, one solution for narrowing the gap between the two
standards would be to create a short-term "improvement" patent and retain the present 17-year term only for "basic" inventions. The filing procedures and subject matter coverage ought
to be identical for both classes, but the basic patent should be
reserved for significant innovations. The present standard of
nonobviousness should be used for the improvement patent,
while the skill of the research scientist should become the standard for the basic patent. In addition, a significant technical advance should be required for the basic patent.
Restricting an improvement to a single patent covering a
single embodiment would reduce the examination burden by
limiting the subject matter that must 'be searched. Inventors of
improvements can survive this restriction simply by choosing to
protect the embodiment with the greatest commercial potential.
Permitting the conversion of an application for one class of
patent into an application for the other class would reduce the
adverse consequences of initially filing for the wrong class.
Authorizing the filing of concurrent applications for both basic
and improvement patents would be desirable for the same reason, and also because less rigorous examination might allow
the improvement patent to be issued earlier. In the event the
improvement patent is issued first, its surrender should be a condition for the granting of a basic patent and the expired portion
of its term should be deducted from the term of the basic patent. Judicial conversion to an improvement patent should be allowed for basic patents which fail to meet the higher standards.
This two-tiered system should close the gap between the
standards of invention applied by the Patent Office and the
courts, while still providing an adequate incentive for innovation. The reward granted would be more commensurate
with the inventor's contribution and the amount spent on research. Long-term protection is less necessary for improvements than for basic inventions, since the development cost for
improvements is usually lower and can generally be recovered
by the inventor with headstart advantages. Also, improvements
often create benefits of higher efficiency and lower costs. The
improvement patent should diminish the examination burden,
simplify patent prosecution, and reduce the costs which are especially burdensome for the independent inventor.
The present patent system lacks a method by which competitors may challenge the grant of patents. As a result, the
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overworked Patent Office too often fails to find or properly
apply the appropriate prior art. Adoption of a citation period
following the publication of an application would provide a
realistic opportunity for competitors to present objections to
the grant of a patent. This procedure would be less expensive
and less susceptible to abuse by corporate giants than the opposition procedure used in some countries. Uncertainty about
the status of patents could be minimized by keeping the citation
period short and limiting citations to prior art not cited by the
examiner. Injury to the patentee due to the delay involved in
the citation process could be avoided by issuing the patent at
the time of publication but subject to cancellation or modification as a result of reexamination. The overall effect of the
citation period should be to reduce the number of invalid patents entering the channels of commerce.
In addition to the citation procedure, an interested party
should have the right to bring a cancellation action in federal
district court. The declaratory action is currently not a satisfactory substitute because of the onerous standing requirement, but the Lear policy of clearing the channels of commerce
of invalid patents128 may lead to liberalization of those requirements. Although the Blonder-Tongue decision came close to
creating a private cancellation remedy, 1 2 9 it is limited by the case
or controversy requirement and by the right of the patent owner
to relitigate on the ground that he lacked a full and fair opportunity to defend the patent in the first action.
The Patent Office has a sufficient interest in the revocation
of invalid patents to justify its right to institute a revocation
action. Such -an action should be conducted within the Office,
in order to utilize its expertise and knowledge about the patent.
The requirement for continuous reexamination could be avoided
by limiting the grounds for revocation to those not raised in the
original examination. There would be little justification for imposing a time limit on revocation actions when none is imposed
on declaratory actions. Like the citation proceedings, revocation
proceedings in the Patent Office should be conducted ex parte
by the same division that examined the application. It is important that the patentee be permitted to limit his claims during the proceeding in an effort to avoid invalidity. The anonymity of complainants and care not to strengthen the presump128. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
129. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Il1.
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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tion of validity of patents unsuccessfully challenged would be
required to encourage the filing of complaints with the Patent
Office. An expeditious revocation procedure could become an
effective "poor man's remedy."
The proposals made in this Article for improving quality
control must be carefully evaluated as to their likely impact
upon research and investment in innovation. Central to this
evaluation is the elasticity to changes in patent protection of
both innovative effort and investment in innovation. If the
author is correct either in his tentative conclusion that the
elasticities are low or in his judgment that these proposals would
not radically decrease overall patent protection, then these proposals should have no serious adverse effect on innovation.
They would unquestionably improve the mechanism for quality
control.

